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CAUSATION IN WHISTLEBLOWING CLAIMS
Nancy M. Modesitt *
INTRODUCTION
Whistleblowing cases have continued to increase in number in
recent years as state and federal legislatures have added protec-
tions for employees who disclose illegal or wrongful activity by
their employers.' But even as the number of cases continues to
climb, cohesive and coherent doctrines applicable in whistleblow-
ing litigation have failed to emerge. A significant reason for this
is that much of whistleblower protection is statutory in nature,
and federal statutes vary greatly from state statutes, even as
state statutes differ. A second reason is that courts have drawn
upon doctrines developed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 in deciding whistleblowing cases, and Supreme Court de-
cisions as well as statutory amendments have frequently altered
legal standards in these cases. And a third reason is that there
are overlapping common law and statutory protections, which re-
sult in the potential for different whistleblowing doctrines to de-
velop, even within a single state.
Causation is one of the elements of a whistleblowing case
where this doctrinal confusion proliferates. While federal statuto-
ry standards appear to be coalescing around requiring the plain-
tiff to prove that the employee's whistleblowing was a contrib-
uting factor in causing the employee to be fired, the same cannot
be said for claims brought under state law.' Causation standards
in state whistleblower cases encompass a wide array of options,
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. Many thanks to
Richard Moberly, Jennifer Pacella, and Anuj Desai for their thoughtful suggestions and
comments. I deeply appreciate the efforts of my research assistants, Jacquelyn LaHecka
and Rafiq Gharbi, as well as the continued support of the law school that made this article
possible.
1. NANCY M. MODESITT ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY
DISCHARGE 1-12 (3d ed. 2015).
2. Nancy M. Modesitt, Why Whistleblowers Lose: An Empirical and Qualitative
Analysis of State Court Cases, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 165, 172, 183 (2013).
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ranging from the stringent standard of requiring that the em-
ployee establish that his or her whistleblowing was the sole cause
of retaliation, to the more lenient standard of requiring that the
employee prove that the whistleblowing was a motivating factor
of the employer's retaliation.3
At the same time, as my earlier work illustrates, inability to
prove causation is one of the more common reasons that whistle-
blowers fail to prevail in litigation.4 This article attempts to bring
coherence to the confusion of state whistleblower causation
standards by: (1) explaining the causation standards presently
used in federal whistleblower protection statutes; (2) identifying
the proliferating causation standards used in whistleblower
claims brought under state law; (3) assessing the most commonly
used causation standards, including exploring the tort causation
doctrine and theory that underlie some of these standards; and
(4) proposing a uniform standard for causation in state whistle-
blower litigation.
I. EXISTING CAUSATION STANDARDS
A. Overview of Whistleblower Claims and the Role of Causation
The classic whistleblower is an employee who discloses an em-
ployer's illegal or wrongful behavior. Decades ago, these whistle-
blowers had no legal protections.5 Employers could fire a whistle-
blower in retaliation for having blown the whistle on their
misconduct.6 However, states began to develop common law pro-
tections against such retaliation through the tort claim of wrong-
ful discharge in violation of public policy.7 Legal protections
quickly expanded, beginning with federal statutory protection for
federal employees who disclosed violations of law or gross mis-
management.8 States followed the lead of the federal government
by enacting statutes that mirrored federal law, by protecting
state and local government employees from retaliation for similar
3. MODESITT ETAL., supra note 1, at 8-39-8-40.
4. Modesitt, supra note 2, at 184.
5. MODESITT ETAL., supra note 1, at 1-3.
6. For a historical overview of the evolution of whistleblower protections, see gener-
ally id. at 1-3-1-16.
7. Id. at 7-3.
8. Id. at 8-3.
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types of disclosures.' Nearly every state has some variation on
this type of protection.'" Additional protections for public sector
employees were recognized by the United States Supreme Court
under the First Amendment, providing a remedy for some gov-
ernment employees whose free speech rights were infringed upon
by governmental retaliation for disclosing wrongdoing on a mat-
ter of public concern."
In the private sector, while common law protections in the form
of wrongful discharge claims have been accepted in some form in
all fifty states, statutory protections have been slower to develop.
To date, less than half of the states provide such protections,12
and there is no federal law that provides general protection for
whistleblowers.'3 However, there are topic-specific federal laws
that protect whistleblowers who disclose wrongdoing of a specific
nature.4 Examples of these topic-specific federal laws include the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which covers employees who disclose viola-
tions of federal securities laws," and the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, which protects employees who blow the
whistle on violations of that health care statute.6
While the contours of the broad array of federal statutory, state
statutory, and common law whistleblower protections vary, all of
these legal protections share a causation requirement: employers
are prohibited from retaliating in certain ways against employees
because the employee engaged in protected activity-however
"protected activity" is defined.'7 This causation element derives
from the common law employment at-will doctrine. Under this
doctrine, employers are free to fire an employee for any or no rea-
9. See id. at 8-25.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983). The Supreme Court has lim-
ited the availability of this claim by only allowing the claim where the employee is not
speaking or disclosing wrongdoing pursuant to his or her official duties. See Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006). Thus, those who ferret out wrongdoing as a part of
their job, and who then disclose that wrongdoing as required by their job, are not protected
by the First Amendment.
12. See MODESITT ET AL., supra note 1, at 6-2.
13. See id. at 3-1.
14. See, e.g., id. at 1-31.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 218C (2012).
17. For descriptions of what constitutes "protected activity" under federal statutes,
see MODESIT ET AL., supra note 1, at 3-6. For an analysis of protected activity under state
statutes, see id. at 6-9, 6-12. For an analysis of protected activity under common law pro-
tections, see id. at 7-12, 7-23.
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son.'8 Thus, when an employee blows the whistle and is subse-
quently fired, the causation question is whether the employer
fired the employee because of the whistleblowing-which is pro-
hibited--or for some other reason-which is allowed by employ-
ment at-will.
In theory, this causation requirement is straightforward. Em-
ployees need to prove that the reason for their termination is be-
cause of their whistleblowing behavior.9 In practice, however, the
requirement becomes complicated by the realities of the work-
place. Employees are rarely perfect. There is nearly always some
conduct by the employee-conduct other than the whistleblowing
behavior-to which the employer can point as the reason for fir-
ing the employee.0 Perhaps recognizing this, courts and legisla-
tures have fashioned a variety of approaches for assessing causa-
tion.
B. Causation in Claims Brought Pursuant to Federal Law
There are two basic types of whistleblowing claims under fed-
eral law. First, there are federal statutory whistleblower claims.
Federal employee whistleblowers are protected by the Whistle-
blower Protection Act ('VPA").21 Private sector employee whistle-
blowers are only protected by federal law if they blow the whistle
on certain topics, such as employers who violate the Clean Air
Act22 or federal laws protecting consumer safety.2 And there is
the potential for whistleblower protections based on the First
Amendment of the Constitution for employees of state govern-
ments.24
Causation standards vary among federal statutes that protect
whistleblowers from retaliation.2' Some statutes do not explicitly
18. For a fairly recent discussion of the rationales underlying employment at-will, see
Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 526 A.2d 1192, 1196-99 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
19. See MODESITT ET AL., supra note 1, at 3-17.
20. See id.
21. See Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2012).
23. See, e.g., Consumer Products Safety Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2087 (2012).
24. See MODESITT ET AL., supra note 1, at 8-13, 8-25 (discussing protections).
25. For an analysis of the causation requirement under federal statutes, see id. at 3-
24-3-25.
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state a causation standard,26 and for such statutes, the standards
have been created by courts.27 These standards have changed over
time. The clearest example of this mutability is found in the cau-
sation standards applied to retaliation claims brought under the
federal antidiscrimination statutes." For this reason, and because
the interpretation of the antiretaliation provisions of Title VII in
particular has been influential in state court whistleblowing cas-
es, it is worth understanding the changes in causation standards
under Title VIi-the preeminent federal antidiscrimination stat-
ute-particularly the standards applied in retaliation claims.29
The origin of Supreme Court doctrine on causation under Title
VII is Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins." In Price Waterhouse, the
causation question fractured the Court, resulting in a plurality
opinion with a number of concurrences. At issue was whether an
employer would be liable for sex discrimination where sex, as well
as other legitimate factors, played a part in the decision not to
promote a woman.3' A plurality of the Court concluded that the
plaintiff need not establish that sex discrimination was the only
cause of the decision or even that the discrimination was the but-
for cause of the decision.32 Instead, the plurality concluded that
the plaintiff need only show that her "gender played a motivating
part in an employment decision."33 Once the plaintiff established
this, the employer could avoid liability only by establishing that it
would have made the same decision regardless of the plaintiffs
34sex.
Because the decision was only by a plurality of the Court, lower
courts and scholars looked to the concurring opinions for guidance
on what would pass muster in terms of establishing causation in
the future. Justice O'Connor was seen as being the decisive vote,
26. See id. at 5-9.
27. See id. at 5-8-5-9.
28. For an overview and explanation of the relationship between Title VII and whis-
tleblowing claims, including the causation analysis under Title VII and its history, see id.
29. The classic retaliation claim is one where an employee complains of employment
discrimination and the employer responds by taking some form of action against the em-
ployee-such as firing or demoting the employee. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53, 60, 67-68 (2006).
30. 490 U.S. 228, 232 (1989).
31. Id. at 231-32.
32. See id. at 241-42.
33. Id. at 244.
34. Id. at 244-45.
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and her concurrence became the guiding standard that lower
courts used. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor limited this
causation standard to cases where the plaintiff presents "direct
evidence" of discrimination.35 Thus, it appeared that there were
two different standards of causation that would apply in Title VII
litigation: (1) the motivating factor standard where the plaintiff
had produced "direct evidence" of discrimination and (2) the but-
for standard to be used where there was no such direct evidence.6
The Price Waterhouse approach was modified by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, which codified parts of the Price Waterhouse
approach, while rejecting others.37 Applicable to Title VII and not
other antidiscrimination statutes, the 1991 Act amended Title VII
to provide that Title VII is violated where a protected category is
"a motivating factor" in an employment decision, even if other
non-prohibited factors were also considered in making the deci-
sion.38 If the plaintiff establishes this, the defendant has a limited
defense as to the damages available in the claim, but cannot
avoid liability.39 Lower courts struggled to decide whether the mo-
tivating factor standard was limited to situations where there
was direct evidence of discrimination." Ultimately, the Supreme
Court clarified that direct evidence is not required to fall within
the ambit of the statute.i
Until recently,2 retaliation claims brought under Title VII,
which are akin to whistleblowing claims, appeared to be subject
to the causation standard articulated in the 1991 Civil Rights
Act, the motivating factor standard, or the standards from Price
Waterhouse.43 However, the Supreme Court set the stage for a
completely different approach in Gross v. FBL Financial Services,
35. Id. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
36. See id. at 262, 276.
37. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/19
90s/civilrights.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
38. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
39. Id. at § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
40. See Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination Law Revis-
ited: A Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REV. 651, 662 (2000).
41. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003).
42. For a description of the chain of events leading to the adoption of the but-for
standard in retaliation claims under Title VII, see generally Kimberly A. Pathman, Pro-
tecting Title VII's Antiretaliation Provision in the Wake of University of Texas Southwest-
ern Medical Center v. Nassar, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 475, 481 (2015).
43. See id. at 476-77, 477 n.3.
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Inc." when it decided that that neither the 1991 Act nor the Price
Waterhouse approach to causation applied to claims brought un-
der the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). 4 Since
the ADEA was not revised by the 1991 Civil Rights Act, the Court
refused to apply the motivating factor standard contained in that
statute. 6 It also refused to apply the Price Waterhouse approach.47
Instead, the Court adopted a but-for causation standard." The on-
ly source of the Court's adoption of the but-for standard was a
brief reference to tort law. 9
After Gross was decided, the Supreme Court pushed the but-for
standard into retaliation cases, beginning with retaliation claims
brought under Title VIL Lower courts have followed the Su-
preme Court's lead,5 applying the but-for standard to First
Amendment retaliation claims.5"
Even as the Supreme Court moved toward a but-for causation
standard in retaliation cases, Congress moved away from it. An
increasing number of federal statutes that protect whistleblowers
have used a contributing factor standard that is somewhat simi-
lar to the motivating factor standard codified in the 1991 Civil
Rights Act. 3 This variation differs from the Title VII version in
two ways: (1) rather than framing the causal connection required
as being a motivating factor in the employer decision, the causa-
tion standard is "a contributing factor,"54 which is a slightly lower
standard and (2) the effect of a finding that an unlawful motive
44. 557 U.S. 167, 169-70 (2009).
45. Id. at 173, 178.
46. Id. at 174.
47. Id. at 178.
48. Id. at 180.
49. The Court also relied on the dictionary definition of "because of' in reaching its
conclusion. Id. at 176.
50. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2523 (2013).
51. Some states never clearly articulated whether the motivating factor approach or
the but-for standard was being used in these cases. See, e.g., Evans v. Cowan, 510 S.E.2d
170, 175 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that "such protected speech or activity [must have
been] the 'motivating' or 'but for' cause for [the plaintiffs] discharge or demotion").
52. See, e.g., Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 526 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that the
motivating factor approach used before Gross has been abrogated by it and applying a but-
for causation standard).
53. See Modesitt, supra note 2, at 183-85 (discussing causation standards under fed-
eral whistleblower protection statutes); see also Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071-1100.
54. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1979.104 (2015) (identifying burdens of proof under AIR-21, a
federal whistleblower protection statute).
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was a factor in the employment decision at issue differs between
the 1991 Act and federal whistleblower protection statutes.5'
As to the former difference, the Supreme Court described the
motivating factor standard as follows: the impermissible consid-
eration "must have 'actually played a role in [the employer's deci-
sion-making] process and had a determinative influence on the
outcome."'56 An alternative explanation is that a motivating factor
is "a reason, alone or with other reasons, on which the [employer]
relied when it [fired] the plaintiff."57 The contributing factor
standard has been interpreted more favorably to the employee.
The Federal Circuit, which has a preeminent role in adjudicating
whistleblowing claims of federal employees, has defined this
standard as "any factor which, alone or in connection with other
factors, tends to affect in any way the outcome of the decision.
58
The language that the unlawful motivation must "affect in any
way" the employer's decision appears to encompass more situa-
tions than the language that the unlawful motivation was one
upon which the employer "relied."9
The second difference between the Title VII approach and the
approach taken under federal whistleblower protection statutes is
more complicated. Under Title VII, the employer is liable if an
unlawful reason (i.e., discrimination based on race) was a moti-
vating factor in the employer's decision to fire an employee." The
employer can avoid paying damages, but not attorney's fees, if the
employer can prove that it would have fired the employee regard-
less of race.6' In contrast, under federal whistleblower protection
provisions, a finding of retaliation being a contributing factor in
an employment decision does not automatically result in liabil-
ity." Rather, an employer can still avoid liability by proving by
55. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1979.104(c) (2015).
56. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000).
57. Model Civ. Jury. Instr. 5.21 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1989)).
58. Marano v. Dep't of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (discussing the
standard under the WPA).
59. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (concluding that "[tihe plaintiff must show
that the employer actually relied on her gender in making its decision"); Marano, 2 F.3d at
1143 ("[T]he employee only needs to demonstrate by preponderant evidence that the fact
of, or content of, the protected disclosure was one of the factors that tended to affect in any
way the personnel action.").
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
61. See, e.g., id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012).
62. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).
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clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the deci-
sion even if the employee had not blown the whistle.63 Thus, in
one sense, Title VII provides greater protection to employees by
establishing liability when the impermissible motive (race) is a
motivating factor. On the other hand, the employer's burden of
proof to avoid paying damages is lower under Title VII than un-
der many federal whistleblowing statutes, as it requires proof by
a preponderance of the evidence,64 while these federal whistle-
blower protection statutes require proof by clear and convincing
evidence.65 Under Title VII, a plaintiff establishing that race was
a motivating factor will obtain attorney's fees,6" while under the
federal statutes the plaintiff would receive nothing if the affirma-
tive defense is established.67
C. State Whistleblower Claims and the Bewildering Array of
Causation Standards
There are far more causation standards found in state whistle-
blowing cases than in federal ones. State causation standards
range from the most difficult for a plaintiff to establish-the sole
cause standard-to the most lenient-the contributing factor
standard.6" This section outlines the variety of approaches taken
across the states.
It is perhaps not surprising that courts have struggled to agree
upon a single causation standard in whistleblowing cases. Whis-
tleblowing claims, at least common law ones, are a species of tort
claim,69 and tort law has struggled to define and describe the con-
tours of causation.0
63. See, e.g., id. (articulating the standard under the WPA).
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012) (allowing a defense where the employer
"demonstrates" that it would have taken the same action even without the impermissible
motive).
65. 29 C.F.R. § 1979.104 (2015).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) (2012).
67. 29 C.F.R. § 1979.104 (2015).
68. See infra notes 71, 105 and accompanying text (discussing application of each
standard).
69. The tort claim is wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. For a thorough
analysis of the contours and history of this claim, see MODESITr ET AL., supra note 1, at 7-
1-7-74.
70. See Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1737
(1985) (opining that "there is no concept which has been as pervasive and yet elusive [in
tort law] as the causation requirement").
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1. Sole Cause Standard
At one end of the spectrum lies the sole cause standard, which
requires that the employee prove that the only reason for the dis-
charge was the employee engaging in protected activity.7' This
standard is found in statutory claims, such as in Tennessee,2 as
well as common law claims, such as in Texas.73 As one court de-
scribed this standard, the plaintiff must establish "an exclusive
causal relationship between the plaintiffs refusal to participate
in or remain silent about illegal activities and the employer's
termination of the employee.,74 Or, as another court stated, this
standard requires that the employee establish that "his discharge
was for no reason other than his [protected activity]. 75 Under this
standard, if there is any other reason that factors into the deci-
sion to terminate the employee-even a second illegitimate rea-
son-the employee cannot establish the necessary causation and
will be unable to prevail.76
Even jurisdictions that have adopted this standard have
acknowledged, if indirectly, its problems. Texas, which first
adopted the sole cause standard for common law claims, subse-
quently refused to adopt a sole cause standard for the statutory
whistleblower protection claim.77 The court noted that the stand-
ard was a high one and indicated that, absent a clear indication
from the legislature in the statute, it would not impose the stand-
ard.8
71. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304(b) (2015) ("No employee shall be discharged
or terminated solely for refusing to participate in, or for refusing to remain silent about,
illegal activities.").
72. See id.
73. Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629, 634 (Tex. 1995); see also
Purdy v. Wright Tree Serv., Inc., 835 N.E.2d 209, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (discussing
standards for wrongful discharge claim and noting that "[i]n order to be successful on a
claim for retaliatory discharge, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her discharge was
solely in retaliation for the exercise of a statutory right").
74. Wooley v. Madison Cty., Tenn., 209 F. Supp. 2d 836, 845 (W.D. Tenn. 2002) (de-
scribing Tennessee's whistleblowing statute).
75. See, e.g., Turner v. Precision Surgical, L.L.C., 274 S.W.3d 245, 252 (Tex. App.
2008) (quoting Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985) in dis-
cussing the "sole reason" standard).
76. See id. at 252-53 (holding that a wrongful discharge claim and a claim that the
employee was fired for seeking workers' compensation are mutually exclusive due to the
sole reason causation standard).
77. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 635.
78. Id. at 634.
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2. Determinative Factor Standard
A slightly less restrictive standard of causation is the determi-
native factor standard. Under this standard, the employee's pro-
tected activity must be "the determinative factor" in the employ-
er's decision to take adverse action against the employee.79 As one
court noted, "[this] causation standard is high."8 ° However, it does
allow claims where there are two reasons for the employee's ter-
mination, so long as the whistleblowing was the determinative
one, making it an easier standard to establish than the sole cause
standard."1
A variation in language on the determinative factor standard is
the "primary reason" standard. This standard requires that the
plaintiff establish, at a minimum, that the primary reason for her
termination was her whistleblowing.82 The term "primary reason"
suggests that the plaintiff must establish that her protected ac-
tivity was the most important reason in the decision to take ac-
tion against her.
3. Because of Standard
A more general standard used by some jurisdictions in estab-
lishing causation is to require that the plaintiff establish that the
employer's action against the employee was because of the em-
ployee's protected conduct.83 Some jurisdictions that use this ap-
proach have not clarified the precise role the protected activity
must have had in the employer's decision, leaving it to the jury to
determine the meaning of "because of." 4 For some jurisdictions,
this may be due to the fact that they have adopted the McDonnell
79. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 289 (Iowa 2000).
80. Id.
81. See id. (stating that "the existence of other legal reasons or motives for the termi-
nation are relevant in considering causation" under the determinative factor test).
82. See, e.g., Adams v. Green Mountain R.R. Co., 862 A.2d 233, 236 (Vt. 2004) (over-
turning the jury verdict in favor of the employee because of insufficient evidence of causa-
tion).
83. Whitman v. City of Burton, 831 N.W.2d 223, 233 (Mich. 2013) (requiring that the
employee prove "that his employer took adverse employment action because of his protect-
ed activity"); Page v. Columbia Nat. Res., Inc., 480 S.E.2d 817, 826 (W. Va. 1996) (noting
that the employee "has the burden to provide prima facie that the discharge occurred be-
cause of the violation of... public policy").
84. See, e.g., Whitman, 831 N.W.2d at 233 (requiring that the employee prove "that
his employer took adverse employment action because of his protected activity" without
defining "because of').
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Douglas burden-shifting approach.s5 In focusing on the plaintiffs
burden of proving a prima facie case, followed by the defendant's
obligation to articulate a legitimate reason for the termination,
followed by the plaintiffs obligation to prove pretext, these courts
seem to pay no attention to the precise causal connection re-
quired.6
However, other jurisdictions have been more precise. For ex-
ample, in Nevada, the state supreme court clarified that, while
the jury instruction that used because of language was proper,
the underlying legal standard is that the employee "must demon-
strate that his protected conduct was the proximate cause of his
discharge."" The use of "the" instead of "a" suggests sole or pri-
mary causation, a high standard for the plaintiff to meet.
4. But-For Standard
The but-for standard of causation is found in state cases as well
as federal cases."8 This standard is found in whistleblowing claims
brought under statutory and common law.9 As an example of the
logic that results in the adoption of this standard, the Supreme
Court of Texas adopted but-for causation in cases brought under
the state's whistleblower protection statute, even though it had
previously endorsed a sole cause standard for whistleblowing
85. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-02 (1973) (stating that once
an employee establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the em-
ployer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejec-
tion).
86. See, e.g., Teetor v. Dawson Pub. Power Dist., 808 N.W.2d 86, 92-93 (Neb. Ct. App.
2012) (noting the adoption of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis in wrongful
discharge claims and discussing the plaintiffs obligation to prove "a causal connection"
without defining the type or degree of requisite causal connection); see also Dolan v. St.
Mary's Mem'l Home, 794 N.E.2d 716, 721 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (using McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting approach and discussing the employee's burden of establishing "a causal
link" without defining the term).
87. Allum v. Valley Bank of Nev., 970 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Nev. 1998). Interestingly, the
court refused to adopt the mixed-motive standard in the case, reasoning that the mixed-
motive standard was at odds with employment at-will. See id.
88. See, e.g., Town of Cheswold v. Vann, 9 A.3d 467, 474 (Del. 2010) (alluding to but-
for standard); Johnson v. D.C., 935 A.2d 1113, 1119 (D.C. 2007) (noting the use of a but-for
standard under the D.C. Whistleblower Protection Act); Cokus v. Bristol Myers Squibb
Co., 827 A.2d 1173, 1185 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002), affd, Cokus v. Bristol Myers-
Squibb Co., 827 A.2d 1098 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (stating that "to sustain a
claim of hostile work environment based upon an employee engaging in whistleblowing
activities under [the New Jersey statute], an employee must establish that the conduct
complained of would not have occurred but for his or her whistleblowing activities").
89. See, e.g., Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex. 1995).
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claims brought pursuant to the common law.9" The court based
this decision on (1) the statutory language-specifically, the stat-
utory causation language because of appeared to be inconsistent
with a sole cause standard-and (2) the fact that it comported
with the court's perspective on the appropriate balance between
statutorily protected interests (i.e., whistleblowing) and the em-
ployment at-will doctrine, in part, because a sole or principal
cause standard would not adequately protect whistleblowers.91
The court also noted that this standard was used by the United
States Supreme Court in employment cases" as well as in several
other statutory whistleblower protection systems.93
5. Substantial Factor Standard
Quite similar to the motivating factor standard is the substan-
tial factor standard. This standard requires that the employee
prove that the protected conduct was "a substantial factor" in the
employer's decision to terminate the employee.94 As one court not-
ed, determining whether this standard is met is "an inquiry that
defies precise definition,"95 potentially because it is unclear just
how much of a role the whistleblowing must play in the employ-
er's decision to take adverse action against the employee in order
to become a substantial factor. This is in contrast to standards
such as "a definitive cause" or "a primary cause."
Sometimes courts apply the substantial factor test in a way
that essentially turns it into a different causation standard. One
court, explicitly drawing on discrimination cases, stated that in
order to be a substantial factor, "the employer's wrongful purpose
must have been 'a factor that made a difference' in the discharge
90. Id. at 632-36.
91. Id. (noting that the but-for causation standard "best protects employees from un-
lawful retaliation without punishing employers for legitimately sanctioning misconduct or
harboring bad motives never acted upon").
92. Id. at 635 (citing Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274, 276 (1977)).
93. Id. at 636 (noting that both Pennsylvania and South Carolina's whistleblower pro-
tection statutes use this standard).
94. See, e.g., Guy v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 79 S.W.3d 528, 539 (Tenn. 2002) (holding
that the common law claim is not preempted by the statutory claim and retaining the sub-
stantial factor causation test for the common law claim); Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc.,
972 P.2d 395, 405 (Utah 1998) (discussing burdens of proof in wrongful discharge claim).
95. Ryan, 972 P.2d at 410.
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decision.96 This definition, in essence, makes the substantial fac-
tor test into a but-for test of motivation.97
Another court, in adopting the substantial factor test, attempt-
ed to provide a sense of what constitutes a substantial factor by
contrasting it with the determinative factor test.9" That court not-
ed that under the determinative factor test, if an employer fires
an employee because of misconduct and protected whistleblowing
activity, the employee will only prevail if the employee can prove
that the employer would not have fired the employee had the em-
ployee not engaged in the protected activity.99 In contrast, the
court noted that under the substantial factor test, the employee
need only prove that that the protected activity was a "signifi-
cant" factor in the firing decision; the employee need not establish
that he would have retained his job had he not engaged in pro-
tected activity.' 00
As one court noted, using the substantial factor test is appro-
priate for two reasons: (1) causation is difficult to prove and (2)
public policy considerations "strongly favor eradication" of certain
employment decisions, including retaliation against whistleblow-
101ers.
6. Motivating Factor Standard
Moving further down the spectrum of standards toward a more
employee-favorable standard is the motivating factor standard. In
a court's typical articulation of this standard, the employee has
the burden of proving that the protected activity "was a motivat-
96. Estes v. Lewis & Clark Coll., 954 P.2d 792, 797 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Nel-
son v. Emerald People's Util. Dist., 840 P.2d 1384, 1390 (Or. Ct. App. 1992), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 862 P.2d 1293 (Or. 1993)).
97. See Hardie v. Legacy Health Sys., 6 P.3d 531, 537-38 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (discuss-
ing the fact that both substantial factor and but-for tests had been in use in Oregon and
concluding that, regardless of terminology, the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the
plaintiff would have been treated differently if the employer had not been motivated by
unlawful considerations); see also Donofry v. Autotote Sys., Inc., 795 A.2d 260, 274 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (holding that the trial court finding that retaliatory motive
played a substantial part in employment decision would fulfill but-for test of causation).




101. See Sharbono v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 161 P.3d 406, 425-26 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2007) (citations omitted).
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ing reason for their discharge.""' This differs from the determina-
tive factor approach because the protected activity need not be
decisive; it can be one of several factors that the employer took in-
to account.
0 3
One variation on the motivating factor standard is the "signifi-
cantly motivated" standard. For example, in Wyoming, an em-
ployee must show that the "discharge was significantly motivated
by retaliation for her exercise of statutory rights" in order to es-
tablish causation.' The addition of the modifier "significantly"
moves the standard closer to a primary or determinative cause
standard.
7. Contributing Factor Standard
At the other end of the spectrum from the "sole reason" stand-
ard lies the contributing factor standard. This standard merely
requires the employee to prove that the protected activity was a
contributing factor in the employer's decision to terminate
them.0 ' It differs from the substantial factor standard in that it
does not contain a minimum threshold of significance of the un-
lawful motive; it appears that as long as the whistleblowing was a
part of the employer's decision to take action against the employ-
ee, that is sufficient to establish causation.' °6 This standard was




However, the court adopting the standard did not explain the
standard in detail.
Even though the language of "contributing factor" makes the
causation standard more employee-favorable than other stand-
ards, in practice, what appears to be a contributing factor stand-
ard can transform into a more difficult standard to prove. For in-
stance, claims brought under Kentucky's whistleblower protection
102. See, e.g., Haney v. Aramark Unif. Servs., Inc., 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 336, 348-49 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2004).
103. See Kinzel v. Discovery Drilling, Inc., 93 P.3d 427, 434 (Alaska 2004) (applying the
motivating factor test to a wrongful discharge claim based on an employee filing a com-
plaint with OSHA); Gasper v. Ruffin Hotel Corp. of Maryland, Inc., 960 A.2d 1228, 1234
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (holding that use of "determinative" instead of "motivating" in
jury instruction was in error because motivating is a lesser burden to prove).
104. Cardwell v. Am. Linen Supply, 843 P.2d 596, 600 (Wyo. 1992).
105. See Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 94 (Mo. 2010).
106. See id.
107. Id. at 95 (adopting the contributing factor approach).
2016] 1207
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
statute use the contributing factor standard, and that standard is
defined as "any factor which, alone or in connection with other
factors, tends to affect in any way the outcome of a decision.
'" 10 8
The District of Columbia's whistleblower protection statute uses
the same definition.1°9 However, in both Kentucky and the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the "contributing factor" language is effectively
modified, either by court interpretation or other statutory provi-
sions, such that the standard applied in litigation is ultimately
higher.10 In the District of Columbia, the language has been in-
terpreted to mean that it only shields an employee who establish-
es "[a] record [that] supports a finding that he would not have
been disciplined except for his status as a whistleblower."' This
interpretation turns "a contributing factor" into a but-for causa-
tion requirement. Similarly, in Kentucky, while a prima facie
claim is established if an employee can show that whistleblowing
was a contributing factor in the adverse employment decision,
another statutory provision states that the employer is not liable
if the employer proves by clear and convincing evidence that the
whistleblowing was not "a material fact" in that decision.
112
As discussed in Part I.B, the contributing factor standard is in
use in numerous federal whistleblower protection statutes.
8. A Welter of Confusion
Some courts have issued decisions which show confusion on the
issue of causation and suggest a multitude of standards that are
applicable. For example, Kentucky courts have held that the
standard of causation in common law claims is that the plaintiff
must prove that the protected activity was "a substantial and mo-
tivating factor but for which the employee would not have been
discharged.""' This statement references three different causa-
tion standards: substantial factor, motivating factor, and but-for
causation. It appears to be an attempt to create a minimum
threshold (substantial) of causation as well as requiring that the
108. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.103 (West 2015).
109. D.C. CODE § 1-615.52(a)(2) (2016).
110. See id.; Crawford v. D.C., 891A.2d 216, 222 (D.C. 2006).
111. Crawford, 891 A.2d at 222 (emphasis added) (citing Carr v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 185
F.3d 1318, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
112. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.103 (West 2015).
113. See, e.g., First Prop. Mgmt. Corp. v. Zarebidaki, 867 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Ky. 1993).
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employee's whistleblowing be a determinative factor in the deci-
sion to take action against the employee. Similarly, in Donofry v.
Autotote Systems, Inc., a New Jersey appellate court referenced
four standards: but-for, substantial factor, motivating factor, and
determinative factor."4 Discussing substantial factor, motivating
factor, and determinative factor, the court stated, "Plaintiffs ul-
timate burden of proof is to prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that his protected, whistleblowing activity was a determi-
native or substantial, motivating factor in defendant's decision to
terminate his employment-that it made a difference.""' 5 The
court appeared to set but-for causation apart from the other three
standards while suggesting that substantial factor, motivating
factor, and determinative factor were all, in essence, different
ways of saying motivating factor."6
Until recently, court decisions interpreting Maine's whistle-
blower protection statute showed a different type of confusion
over the application of causation standards. In the absence of
clear guidance from the state supreme court, Maine's lower courts
issued decisions that indicated conflicting beliefs on what the
causation standard should be. One lower court determined that in
order to establish liability, a plaintiff need not establish that the
whistleblowing behavior was the sole reason for her termina-
tion."7 Instead, the court appeared to use the motivating factor
standard, stating that,
[t]he plaintiff need not show that her whistleblower activity was the
sole reason for her termination. Her overall burden is met if a rea-
sonable jury could conclude that the defendant employer's purported
reasons for her termination were false or that the employer was
more likely motivated by her protected activity."1
8
Later in the case, the court appeared to use a but-for or sole
cause standard, stating that,
[r]egarding causation, it remains in dispute whether Plaintiff was
fired for the reasons Defendant maintains (e.g., due to data received
from the finance director; negative feedback during the program re-
view; and Plaintiffs reaction to an anonymous letter), or whether
Plaintiff was in fact fired for her reporting of abuse to DHS and con-
114. 795 A.2d 260, 273-74 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2001).
115. Id. at 273.
116. See id. at 273-74.
117. Mowatt v. John Murphy Homes, Inc., No. Civ. A. CV-01-201, 2003 Me. Super
LEXIS 126, at *5 (May 30, 2003).
118. Id. (citation omitted).
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sequently for losing the two largest cases in Children's Services.
Resolution of these issues is for a jury." 9
Another Maine case more clearly indicated that the standard
would be a sole cause standard, stating that,
[t]he problem is that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a causal
connection between her whistleblowing and termination because
other factors came into play such as her refusal to serve Defendant
McRae when he tried to conduct business. Hence, Defendant Pratt
Abbott had a valid reason to terminate her employment and her
claim must fail because she has failed to meet her burden of persua-
sion on the issue of causation.2 '
In this case, the court appeared to be suggesting that as long as
the employer had a valid reason to take the action it did, causa-
tion could not be established. This language appeared to suggest
a requirement that the plaintiff prove that the sole cause of the
termination was whistleblowing.
In 2014, Maine's supreme court clarified the standard. In ad-
dressing the proper jury instructions in a whistleblowing claim
under the state whistleblower protection statute, the court stated
that, "[t]o demonstrate a causal link, the plaintiff must show that
the protected activity (whistleblowing) 'was a substantial, even
though perhaps not the only, factor motivating the employee's
dismissal."""' The court then explained that this required the em-
ployee to prove that the whistleblowing was a factor "that made a
difference"; that is, without the whistleblowing, the employee
would not have suffered from the employment decision at issue.122
Even this decision is not quite clear on the standard because it
suggests three different causation standards: substantial factor,
motivating factor, and but-for causation (by explaining the test as
requiring that whistleblowing was a factor that made a difference
in how the employee was treated).
123
119. Id.
120. Meserve v. Toba Tarp, Inc., No. CV. 02-425, 2003 Me. Super. LEXIS 175, at *5
(Aug. 22, 2003).
121. Caruso v. Jackson Lab., 98 A.3d 221, 226 (Me. 2014) (quoting Walsh v. Town of
Millinocket, 28 A.3d 610, 615 (Me. 2011)).
122. Id. (quoting Wells v. Franklin Broad. Corp., 403 A.2d 771, 773 (Me. 1974)).
123. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYsIcAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 26 cmts. a, b (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (explaining but-for causation standard).
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II. FLAWS IN EXISTING STANDARDS
The combination of confusion within states on causation along
with the proliferation of standards calls for action to be taken to
clarify both the appropriate standard and what that standard
should mean. This section of the article assesses existing stand-
ards, including consideration of tort law-the commonly identi-
fied source of such standards. Nearly all of the existing causation
standards suffer from significant flaws that make meeting them
quite difficult, if not impossible, for most whistleblowers.
A. Standards That are More Stringent Than But-For Causation
At one end of the spectrum lie the standards that require whis-
tleblowers to prove causation at a level that is more exacting than
the but-for standard, such as the sole cause standard and prima-
ry reason standard. These standards should not be adopted by
statute or used by courts in whistleblowing cases. First, they shift
the focus of litigation away from the employer's behavior onto the
employee's behavior. Rather than addressing whether the em-
ployee blew the whistle and was retaliated against, the primary
focus of litigation will likely be on the employee's performance of
her job. This is because the employer need only establish that
there was some aspect of job performance that contributed to the
firing decision in order to avoid liability. The employer can admit,
for purposes of summary judgment, that the employee blew the
whistle, that the employer was aware of this, and that it was a
factor taken into account in firing the employee, and yet still pre-
vail. And given the reality that no employee is perfect, there will
always be some aspect of job performance that can be identified
as a factor that contributed to the decision. The end result of this
is whistleblowing protection in name only, but not in reality. Fur-
thermore, these standards impose a higher standard than causa-
tion standards found in tort doctrine, which, as described in Part
II.B, are commonly lower standards of but-for or substantial fac-
tor causation. Thus, these standards should be avoided.
B. But-For Causation
But-for causation is a standard that has the potential to be-
come the predominant standard in whistleblowing cases because
of the Supreme Court's recent adoption of it in retaliation claims
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brought under Title VII. 14 The but-for causation standard should
not be used in whistleblowing litigation because there are signifi-
cant pragmatic issues with its use, its adoption from tort doctrine
is not justifiable, and it lacks sufficient theoretical support.
1. Pragmatic Problems with the But-For Standard
Pragmatically, the but-for test is not ideal. The difficulty with
the standard in whistleblowing cases is threefold: (1) it creates a
binary choice for the fact-finder as to whether the employment
decision at issue was due to whistleblowing or some problem in
the employee's performance, and in the employment at-will set-
ting, the employer has a significant evidentiary advantage; (2) it
is nearly impossible for a plaintiff to produce affirmative proof of
an employer's bad motivation because the only evidence, in this
day and age, is in the mind of an individual; and (3) because of
points (1) and (2), there is potential to push the focus of litigation
away from the whistleblowing behavior and into a scrutiny of the
employee's work performance.
As to the first problem, because employees are at-will, in order
to establish liability under a but-for causation standard, whistle-
blowers have to prove that had they not blown the whistle, they
would have avoided harm.'25 In practice this means that the em-
ployee must prove that the company would not have taken ad-
verse action against him if he had not disclosed its wrongdoing."'
Humans being fallible, it is inevitable that the employee has
made errors at work that can serve as an employer's justification
for taking action. Furthermore, the norm in the workplace has
become a situation where employers document any concerns they
have with employees, creating a record that they can rely upon in
124. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013).
125. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
26, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (explaining the but-for standard of causation as when "in
the absence of the act, the outcome would not have occurred").
126. Under tort doctrine, this could be seen as distinguishing between whether the
plaintiffs poor job performance or conduct was an environmental condition that should
have no effect on eliminating her recovery or whether the poor job performance or conduct
was a cause of her discharge, with the potential to diminish or eliminate recovery. If the
former, the whistleblowing plaintiff would be akin to the thin-skulled plaintiff in torts and
would be entitled to full recovery. See Mario J. Rizzo & Frank S. Arnold, Causal Appor-
tionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic Theory, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1407-08
(1980) (discussing the distinction between conditions and causes in tort law).
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litigation."7 This record can look quite official and neutral, while
the employee's rebuttals tend not to be a part of any "official"
documents and thus appear to be post-hoc rationalizations or ex-
128cuses.
The second related difficulty that whistleblowers face in estab-
lishing but-for causation is that direct evidence of an employer's
intent to retaliate for whistleblowing is nearly impossible to ob-
tain.'29 The employee lacks the documentation of the employer's
retaliatory motive needed to rebut the employer's documentation
of whatever performance or conduct errors an employee has
made.3 ° And in whistleblowing cases, plaintiffs are in an even
worse position than in Title VII cases in terms of producing proof
of animus.3' Unlike in discrimination claims, anecdotal evidence
of animus toward the protected group (whistleblowers) is unlikely
to exist. Attitudes toward protected groups under Title VII can be
revealed in day-to-day comments, such as commenting on a wom-
an's appearance or telling a derogatory joke.32 In contrast, atti-
tudes about whistleblowers are not a part of common, everyday
discussions. There is no universe of jokes that relies on stereo-
types about whistleblowers such as those that exist for protected
categories under Title VII.
Perhaps because of the lack of such evidence, one of the com-
mon methods of proving causation indirectly in whistleblowing
cases is to establish that the employer knew of the whistleblowing
and then retaliated against the employee soon thereafter.'33 Un-
127. See STEPHEN P. PEPE & SCOTT H. DUNHAM, AVOIDING & DEFENDING WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE CLAIMS § 3:1 (2016) (noting that a "regular written performance evaluation
procedure is also an essential, if not the crucial, element in limiting wrongful discharge
lawsuits over job performance').
128. See id.
129. This issue is essentially the same as what occurs in Title VII litigation, where the
employer argues that it had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for taking action
against an employee, and the employee argues that the action was taken because of the
employee's race, sex, color, religion, or national origin. See Marin J. Katz, The Fundamen-
tal Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94
GEO. L.J. 489, 515-16 (2006) (noting that evidence of improper motive is difficult to obtain
and that the employer controls most of the evidence of motive).
130. Id.
131. But see Darren A. Feider, Federal Whistleblower and Retaliation Laws, WILLIAMS,
KASTNER & GIBBS http://www.williamskastner.com/uploadedFiles/Feider -a ticle.pdf (not-
ing the difficulty of defending whistleblower claims) (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
132. See, e.g., EEOC v. Boeing Co., 577 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that
the supervisor's frequent demeaning and derogatory comments about women were suffi-
cient to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination).
133. See, e.g., West v. Gen. Motors Corp., 665 N.W.2d 468, 470-71 (Mich. 2003) (dis-
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fortunately for whistleblowers, courts have narrowly interpreted
the context in which this circumstantial evidence is sufficient. For
example, in Georgia, the court of appeals indicated that this kind
of circumstantial evidence would be limited to cases where the re-
taliation occurred less than three months after the whistleblow-
ing and suggested that a much shorter time of one month to six
weeks might be required.' Nor is the Georgia case an outlier;
there are a number of courts that have reached similar conclu-
sions, or even more limiting conclusions, regarding the eviden-
tiary effect of adverse action within a short time of the whistle-
blowing. '35
The ultimate effect of these evidentiary issues is for employers
to focus litigation on employee conduct and/or job performance.
This is the employment litigation equivalent of the "blame the
victim" approach that was used for years in sexual assault cas-
es.'3 6 Instead of focusing on the conduct of the person who alleged-
ly committed the assault (firing), the litigation focuses on the
conduct of the person who was assaulted (fired)."7
These practical problems of proof suggest that the standard for
whistleblowers should be lowered if whistleblowers are to be ade-
quately protected from retaliation.
cussing a plaintiff who attempted to satisfy causation by showing adverse action after re-
porting wrongdoing).
134. Freeman v. Smith, 750 S.E.2d 739, 743-44 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013), cert. denied (Feb.
24, 2014) (stating that 'very close' temporal proximity" between whistleblowing and retal-
iation is required).
135. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 474 F.3d 307, 321 (6th Cir. 2007)
("The law is clear that temporal proximity, standing alone, is insufficient to establish a
causal connection for a retaliation claim."); Shaw v. Ecorse, 770 N.W.2d 31, 41 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2009) ("A temporal connection between protected activity and an adverse employ-
ment action does not, in and of itself, establish a causal connection ... but it is evidence of
causation.") (citation omitted); West, 665 N.W.2d at 473 (explaining that to satisfy the cau-
sation requirement under the WPA, a "[p]laintiff must show something more than merely
a coincidence in time between protected activity and adverse employment action").
136. See Ofer Zur, Rethinking 'Don't Blame the Victim: The Psychology of Victimhood,
ZUR INST., http://www.zurinstitute.comlvictimhood.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
137. Compare id. ('The most obvious manifestations of this 'blame the victim approach'
are rape cases. Women victims are too often blamed for being provocative, seductive, sug-
gestive, for proposing, teasing, or just plain 'asking for it."'), with West, 665 N.W.2d at 473
('The fact that a plaintiff engages in a 'protected activity' under the [WPA] does not im-
munize him from an otherwise legitimate, or unrelated, adverse job action.").
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2. Tort Doctrine and the But-For Standard
Given the Supreme Court's recitation of tort law as a justifica-
tion for using but-for causation in retaliation claims brought un-
der Title VII, 13s it is helpful to consider whether the but-for stand-
ard is supportable in whistleblower claims based on tort doctrine.
Specifically, the Supreme Court stated that, "[c]ausation in fact-
i.e., proof that the defendant's conduct did in fact cause the plain-
tiffs injury-is a standard requirement of any tort claim.' 39 In
support of this position, the Court cited to several sections of the
First Restatement of Torts.4 ' A closer look at tort doctrine shows
that it is by no means a given that the but-for standard should be
used. First, tort doctrine on causation in intentional tort claims
does not indicate that the but-for standard should be the default
standard in whistleblowing cases. Second, negligence causation
doctrine also does not lead to the inexorable adoption of the but-
for standard.
As to the first point, there is a good reason why the Court
would not cite to the Second or Third Restatements of Torts: nei-
ther one supports the use of the but-for causation standard in the
employment discrimination context. Nor does either support the
use of the but-for test in the whistleblowing context. Employment
discrimination cases, except for disparate impact claims, require
proof of intent,' as do whistleblowing claims.'42 This makes the
claims more similar to intentional tort claims than negligence
claims. The Second Restatement of Torts defines causation in in-
tentional tort cases as follows: "[i]n order that a particular act or
omission may be the legal cause of an invasion of another's inter-
est, the act or omission must be a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm."'' 3 Thus, the Second Restatement would appear
138. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2524-25 (2013).
139. Id. at 2524.
140. See id. at 2524-25 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 9 (AM. LAW INST. 1934) (defin-
ing 'legal cause"), § 279 cmt. c (intentional infliction of physical harm), § 280 (other inten-
tional torts), § 281(c) (negligence), § 431 cmt. a (defining 'legal cause")).
141. See Tidwell v. Fort Howard Corp., 989 F.2d 406, 410 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting the
need to prove intentional discrimination in Title VII cases).
142. See, e.g., Chadwell v. Koch Ref. Co., L.P., 251 F.3d 727, 734 (8th Cir. 2001) (noting
that it is "well settled that the Minnesota Whistleblower Statute requires proof of inten-
tional retaliation").
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 9 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (emphasis add-
ed).
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to support the use of the substantial factor standard, not the but-
for standard.
The Third Restatement of Torts addresses causation as a com-
ponent of specific intentional tort claims rather than as one rule
applied to all intentional tort claims, as the Second Restatement
does.' For example, the Third Restatement indicates that while
causation is usually not an issue in battery claims,'4' when it is,
causation issues should be addressed using either the but-for
test,1 46 or, where there are multiple sufficient causes of injury-
such as one tortious cause and one non-tortious cause-by allow-
ing factual cause to be established if the tortious cause would
have been sufficient absent the non-tortious cause."' In the whis-
tleblowing context, this would translate into using the but-for test
where there is not a second cause (plaintiffs job performance or
conduct) at issue, and allowing a jury to decide whether the job
performance or conduct and the whistleblowing were each a suffi-
cient cause of the discharge.' As discussed above, it is the norm
for employers to focus on the employee's job performance in whis-
tleblowing cases. The default whistleblowing scenario is thus a
multiple cause scenario, where the Third Restatement would use
a sufficient causation approach, not the but-for test.'49 Thus, the
Third Restatement does not support the adoption of the but-for
test as the default standard in whistleblowing cases.
A lower standard than but-for causation has been used in in-
tentional tort claims where the defendant's conduct is morally
worse"° than in negligence claims, where the defendant is merely
acting in a manner that is unreasonably risky.' In many inten-
144. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS
xiii (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2014).
145. Id. § 101 cmt. k (noting that "[t]he factual-cause requirements for harmful battery,
that the actor be the factual cause of both the contact and the resulting harm, are ordinar-
ily easy to apply").
146. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
26 cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST., 2010) ('The standard for factual causation.., is familiarly re-
ferred to as the 'but-for' test.").
147. Id. § 27 cmt. 2 ("[L]iability [is imposed] when a tortfeasor's conduct, while not nec-
essary for the outcome, would have been a factual cause if the other competing cause had
not been operating.").
148. See Pathman, supra note 42, at 477.
149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27
(AM. LAW. INST. 2010).
150. This is because of the intent requirement that the defendant act with knowledge
that the harm is substantially certain to result from his conduct. Id. § 1.
151. Id. § 3.
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tional tort claims, causation is included as a requirement, but its
role in the analysis of the claim is minimal. For example, battery
requires proof that the defendant acted with intent to cause a
harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff, and that such con-
tact resulted from the defendant's action.152 While causation is
mentioned, it is unclear whether cases focus on but-for causation,
motivating factor causation, or some other standard.'53
However, there are some intentional tort claims where causa-
tion is in fact discussed in detail. One of those claims is Inten-
tional Infliction of Emotional Distress ("IIED"), a claim notorious-
ly viewed with skepticism by courts. In IIED cases, causation is a
specific element.' However, even in these claims, there are few
situations where courts have addressed what is meant by causa-
tion. For example, most courts simply state something to the ef-
fect that the plaintiff must prove a causal connection between the
conduct of the defendant and the emotional distress, and that
once the plaintiff establishes the requisite conduct, the jury can
infer causation.'5 A few courts have been more specific. In Mitch-
ell v. Giambruno, the court noted that proof of causation would be
established if the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in
establishing the plaintiffs emotional distress."' Similarly, Missis-
sippi has also used the substantial factor test.'.7 Thus, causation
152. Indeed, some courts explicitly reject the idea that causation is an element of a bat-
tery claim. See, e.g., Duncan v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging, Ltd., 70 P.3d 435, 443 (Ariz.
2003) (noting that "any action brought under the [state medical malpractice statute] re-
quires proof of elements not present in a common law action for battery, including duty,
breach, and causation"). But see Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d
225, 227 (Ohio 1996) (noting that a battery claim requires proof of causation).
153. See, e.g., Gerety v. Demers, 589 P.2d 180, 191 (N.M. 1978) (noting that "[als to
causation in a battery action, the tort of battery is the wrongful touching of the patient's
body which by itself gives the patient a claim for substantial damages" and saying nothing
further regarding causation); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 400 S.E.2d 472, 475 (N.C. Ct. App.
1991), aff'd, 417 S.E.2d 447 (N.C. 1992) (noting that "[t]he elements of battery are intent,
harmful or offensive contact, causation, and lack of privilege" and not discussing causa-
tion). But see Flores v. Flushing Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 490 N.Y.S.2d 770, 772 (N.Y. App. Div.
1985) (refusing to determine whether lack of informed consent claim is negligence or bat-
tery, but noting that battery requires proof of causation using the but-for test).
154. See, e.g., Johnson v. Thigpen, 788 So. 2d 410, 412 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (artic-
ulating elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
155. See, e.g., Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320, 1324 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (noting
that "[wihen [the defendant's] conduct is extreme and outrageous ... it is more likely that
the severe emotional distress suffered by the victim was actually caused by the [defend-
ant's] misconduct rather than by another source"); Purina Mills, Inc. v. Odell, 948 S.W.2d
927, 935-36 (Tex. App. 1997) (allowing jury to infer causation).
156. 826 N.Y.S.2d 788, 790-91 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
157. See, e.g., Mississippi ex rel. State for Use & Benefit of Richardson v. Edgeworth,
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doctrine in intentional tort claims does not automatically lead to
the conclusion that the but-for test should be adopted in whistle-
blowing cases.
Second, even in negligence claims, tort doctrine on causation
has developed significantly since the First Restatement cited by
the United States Supreme Court. In the early 1900s, in as-
sessing causation, judges combined policy judgments as to wheth-
er a defendant should be liable with more evidence-based consid-
erations as to whether the defendant caused the plaintiffs harm
when determining liability in negligence cases."' In essence, this
combined what is now seen as proximate cause analysis with
cause-in-fact analysis. Ultimately, policy judgments on liability
were seen as belonging in proximate cause analysis, while factual
issues as to whether the defendant's conduct led to the plaintiffs
injury were the focus of cause-in-fact analysis.5' However, it be-
came clear that policy judgments remained in the cause-in-fact
analysis.' As Wex Malone argued, the identification of potential
contributing causes to an injury is an evaluative, policy-laden
process.' To borrow one of Malone's examples, if a young person
drives too fast on a gravel road, dislodging a rock that strikes a
pedestrian, different people would identify different causes of the
injury.6 ' The driver's parents might identify the inexperience of
their child as the cause; a transportation engineer might identify
the road design as the cause; and a physicist might identify the
velocity and trajectory of the wheel as it struck the rock as the
cause.'63 The decision of which of these potential causes to identify
for the purposes of adjudicating tort liability contains policy
judgments."'
As this example illustrates, causation issues tend to arise when
there are multiple events culminating in the plaintiffs injury.
While the but-for test of causation is commonly used in many
negligence cases, it is discarded in situations where policy de-
214 So. 2d 579, 581 (Miss. 1968) (applying the substantial factor standard to an IIED
claim).
158. Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1737 (1985).
159. Id. at 1737-38.
160. Id.
161. See Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 65-66
(1956).
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mands a less rigorous standard. The first of these scenarios in
tort law where causation standards vary from the but-for test is
where there is more than one cause of the plaintiffs injury. 16 5 The
substantial factor test has been used when two defendants are
negligent and the negligence injures the plaintiff, but it is not
possible to determine to what extent, if at all, either defendant's
negligence injured the plaintiff.166 A classic example of this is
when two defendants negligently release salt water that enters
the plaintiffs pond.167 Even though both defendants fail the but-
for test,' 6 8 courts have allowed the plaintiff to recover.169 Courts
have also allowed recovery using the substantial factor test,
where a defendant's negligence combines with a force of nature to
create an injury, such as where a defendant's negligently set fire
combines with a fire of unknown origins and it damages the
plaintiffs property.7 '
In short, there are a number of situations in which the plain-
tiffs failure to fulfill the traditional but-for causation construct
does not preclude the plaintiff from recovery in intentional torts
and negligence cases. Thus, the but-for test should not be the au-
tomatic default standard in whistleblowing cases.
3. Causation Theory and the But-For Standard
The theoretical underpinnings of the causation doctrines noted
above are hotly debated. There are a number of central theories
advanced regarding the purpose of tort doctrine that have differ-
ent implications for causation standards.71
165. See James E. Viator, When Cause-In-Fact Is More Than Fact: The Malone-Green
Debate on the Role of Policy in Determining Factual Causation in Tort Law, 44 LA. L. REv.
1519, 1526 (1984) (discussing how "the but-for test breaks down 'in situations where there
are two independent factors, each being sufficient to produce the injury") (citation omit-
ted).
166. See Wright, supra note 158, at 1792.
167. Landers v. E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S.W.2d 731, 731-32 (Tex. 1952).
168. This is because as to each defendant, the plaintiff would not have avoided injury
even if that defendant had used reasonable care-the pond would still be damaged by the
other defendant's salt water. See id. at 734.
169. Id. at 735.
170. See, e.g., Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W.
45, 46-47, 49 (Minn. 1920).
171. Obviously, many books and articles have been written on causation theory. It
would be impossible to address exhaustively tort theoretical approaches to causation. My
purpose in this section is not to do so, but instead merely to illustrate that under two of
the main approaches, the use of the but-for standard is not inevitable, or even obviously
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Corrective justice theory is grounded in the idea that where
one individual harms another, it is legally appropriate to hold
that individual liable for the harm caused.'72 This theory general-
ly suggests a strong causation requirement; if an individual en-
gages in risky behavior that causes no harm, there is no "correc-
tive justice" needed because the individual does not impose costs
on another.73 However, not all corrective justice theorists agree
with this. Christopher Schroeder has argued that "the connection
between corrective justice and causation seems simply to be as-
sumed" and that causation is not essential to the theory.
74
Schroeder instead postulates that the corrective justice theory is
based on three requirements: "(1) individual liability must be as-
sessed consistently with moral norms of responsibility for one's
actions; (2) victims must be made whole (compensated); and (3)
the resources for satisfying (2) must come exclusively from the li-
ability payments required by (i).' ' 7 Under this conception of cor-
rective justice, causation is not central to the theory.1 76 Instead,
liability is predicated on holding actors accountable for the in-
creased risk of harm to others that they create.
17
Under corrective justice theories, causation in whistleblowing
cases does not require the use of the but-for standard. As long as
the whistleblowing was a part of the reason for the plaintiffs dis-
charge, corrective justice theories would support employer liabil-
ity commensurate with the extent the whistleblowing caused the
discharge.178 Thus, liability should be allowed under lower causa-
tion standards.
correct.
172. As Richard Wright describes it, corrective justice requires "as a matter of individ-
ual justice between the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant who has caused an inju-
ry to the plaintiff in violation of his rights in his person or property must compensate him
for such injury." Richard W. Wright, Actual Causation vs. Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane
of Economic Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 435 (1985).
173. See Alan Schwartz, Responsibility and Tort Liability, 97 ETHICS 270, 270 (1986).
174. Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37
UCLA L. REV. 439, 445 (1990); see also Viator, supra note 165, at 1527-29 (discussing how
fairness considerations do not necessarily support causation as a limitation on liability).
175. Schroeder, supra note 174, at 450.
176. Id. at 451.
177. Id.
178. Martin H. Malin, The Distributive and Corrective Justice Concerns in the Debate
Over Employment At-Will: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 117, 125
(1992).
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A second central theory of torts is the law and economics theo-
ry. Under this theory, the goal of tort law is focused on deterring
behavior that is economically inefficient.9 The focus of this is on
a societal, rather than individual, level; thus, it takes into ac-
count what maximizes wealth for the whole, rather than for an
individual. s° Causation as a requirement for liability to attach is
not central to this approach,' although some adherents have
supported its continued existence in doctrine.8 2 For example,
Mario J. Rizzo and Frank S. Arnold have advocated for the use of
causation analysis to determine apportionment of damages in
torts claims using economic theories.183 Employer liability for dis-
charging whistleblowers would be appropriate under economic
theories because it would encourage lawful behavior by compa-
nies, maximizing social wealth. Thus, limiting liability by using a
but-for standard of causation, with the pragmatic problems that
it causes, is inconsistent with this economic model.
In sum, neither tort doctrine nor theory dictates the use of a
but-for causation standard. Indeed, given the typical litigation
scenario, where employee performance or conduct is argued as a
cause of the employee's termination, tort doctrine and theory
suggest that the use of other causation standards is appropriate.
C. Motivating Factor/Substantial Factor Standards
The next standards on the spectrum of causation are the sub-
stantial factor test and motivating factor test. These standards
are addressed together because both suggest the requirement
that the whistleblowing reach a certain level of importance in the
employer's decision to take adverse action against an employee.
8
1
179. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972).
180. See id. at 32.
181. As one scholar noted, the causal inquiry is subsumed by the policy of maximizing
social wealth. See Wright, supra note 158, at 1738-39 (describing the economic analysis of
causation).
182. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic
Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 131 (1983); Schroeder, supra note 174, at 443-49
(providing an excellent synopsis of the corrective justice and law and economics approach-
es to causation).
183. Rizzo & Arnold, supra note 126, at 1405-06.
184. See John L. Flynn, Mixed-Motive Causation Under the ADA: Linked Statutes,
Fuzzy Thinking, and Clear Statements, 83 GEO L. J. 2009, 2010 (1995) (defining the moti-
vating factor test); Susan R. Heylman, Employee Must Show Work Was Substantial Factor
in Disability, Alaska High Court Says, SOC'Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Jan. 27, 2012),
http://www.shrm.org/legalissues/stateandlocalresources/pages/employeemustshowwork.as
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The substantial factor test is sometimes applied in tort cases
when there are multiple potential causes of harm, and yet the
causes fail the but-for test.8 ' The substantial factor test, or a var-
iant of it, the motivating factor test, has been used in some juris-
dictions as the causation standard for whistleblowing claims.'
Its use has been derived from the causation standards articulated
in constitutional tort claims.187 While this might indicate a ten-
dency toward broad acceptance in state courts, it has only been
adopted in a small number of jurisdictions.'88 Furthermore, this
number is likely to decrease, not increase, due to the Supreme
Court's decisions in Nassar5 9 and Gross,9 ° which implemented
the but-for test for causation as the default standard to be fol-
lowed in retaliation cases.
Regardless of the state of acceptance of the substantial factor
or motivating factor test, its use is not ideal in whistleblowing
cases. First, as to the motivating factor standard, even though it
appears to be a more favorable standard for employees than the
but-for standard, Title VII litigation experience suggests that, in
reality, it is not significantly helpful for plaintiffs. It is well-
documented that plaintiffs in Title VII litigation do not fare par-
ticularly well. 9' Their success rates have remained low for years
at a fairly consistent rate.'92 This suggests that the change in
standard will not actually assist plaintiffs in establishing causa-
tion.
One potential reason that the change from but-for to motivat-
ing or substantial factor may not make much of a difference in
outcomes is that it is too subtle a change. The very terminology
may make it difficult to establish. "Substantial" indicates a signif-
icant factor, which may lead jurors to weigh how much of the em-
px (defining the substantial factor test).
185. See Erik S. Knutsen, Ambiguous Cause-in-Fact and Structured Causation: A Mul-
ti-Jurisdictional Approach, 38 TEX. INT'L. L. J. 249, 253 (2003).
186. See, e.g., Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 179 P.3d 246, 248 (Colo. App. 2007).
187. See id. (noting Mount Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) as the source of
the standard).
188. See, e.g., Pierce v. Cotuit Fire Dist., 741 F.3d 295, 301-02 (1st Cir. 2014); Ashman
v. Barrows, 438 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2006); Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d
Cir. 2000).
189. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2524-25 (2013).
190. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176-77 (2009).
191. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plain-
tiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 103, 104 (2009).
192. Id. at 106.
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ployer's decision to terminate an employee was based on whistle-
blowing rather than other reasons. Similarly, "motivating" sug-
gests that the illicit reason must have been the driving force be-
hind the employer's adverse action.
It might also be that the change in standard does not adequate-
ly address the typical dynamic in employment cases, where the
fundamental argument is whether an employee was fired due to
an unlawful reason or any other reason.193 Thus, even though the
motivating factor standard allows a plaintiff to recover where
there are multiple reasons for the termination and does not re-
quire that the employer's illicit motivation must surpass the but-
for threshold, the litigation dynamic is still likely to lead juries to
an either/or choice.194 Whether the standard is but-for causation
or motivating or substantial factor causation, the judge or jury is
faced with a binary choice between the two explanations for the
employer's adverse action: the employee's whistleblowing or the
employee's job performance or conduct.9' While in theory, under a
motivating factor causation approach, there can be multiple fac-
tors leading to the decision to terminate the employee. The second
aspect of the motivating factor test feeds into this binary choice.'96
Under the 1991 Civil Rights Act, the employer is able to avoid
paying damages if it proves that it would have taken the same ac-
tion regardless of the employee's complaint of discrimination."'
This is, in essence, giving the employer a win-which goes back to
the binary nature of the choice the factfinder must make. Similar-
ly, under the federal whistleblower protection statutes, the moti-
vating factor standard's apparent acceptance of multiple causes is
undercut by the defense given to employers-if the employer
would have made the same decision in the absence of whistle-
blowing conduct, then the employer avoids liability. Thus, even in
the face of a standard that appears to allow plaintiffs to prevail
when there are multiple causes for the retaliation, the choice for
193. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2522, 2525.
194. See Gross, 557 U.S. at 170-71, 179.
195. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525; Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 179 P.3d 246, 247-
48 (Colo. App. 2007). One could argue that the partial defense created by the 1991 Act
might actually create a sliding scale of liability rather than a binary choice. However, be-
fore the defense comes into play, the plaintiff still must establish that a motivating factor
in the employment decision was unlawful discrimination. Taylor, 179 P.3d at 247-48. It is
at this point that the factfinder is faced with the choice between the plaintiffs and the
employer's explanations.
196. Taylor, 179 P.3d at 248.
197. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2002e-5(g)(B) (2012).
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the factfinder remains binary at heart-is it "really" about whis-
tleblowing, or is it "really" about a bad employee? Given the reali-
ty that the employer nearly always has some documentation-
even if after the fact-of the employee's less-than-perfect job per-
formance, while there is almost never any documentation of an
employer's retaliatory animus, it is easier for a jury to believe the
employer rather than the employee.9 '
As for the substantial factor test, which is primarily a tort law
construct, its use in employment cases is not entirely consistent
with tort theories of liability. The substantial factor test is gener-
ally justified as a doctrine by virtue of the fact that as between
one innocent plaintiff and two negligent defendants, the cost of
loss should fall on the negligent defendants so long as there is a
sufficient causal connection between the negligence and the
plaintiffs injury.'99 As a matter of corrective justice, it is appro-
priate to hold these defendants responsible for the plaintiff's inju-
ry.2°° It is also economically efficient to do so-if defendants could
escape liability in these situations, there would be a gap in the
incentive structure that could be exploited and could result in
greater societal costs."' Defendants would not undertake safety
measures that would benefit society if they were not held liable.2
However, this justification is missing in the employment context.
As a matter of corrective justice, rather than an innocent plaintiff
and two wrongdoers, it is the defendant who points to the plain-
tiff as having "caused" the employment decision.' This weakens
the moral basis for lowering the causation standard."4 In addi-
198. See supra text accompanying note 63 (discussing that, under federal whistleblow-
er protection statutes, the defendant can avoid liability by proving that they would have
fired that employee, even if the employee had not blown the whistle); see also Mason v.
Seaton, 942 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tenn. 1997) (suggesting that employees cannot provide di-
rect documentation of retaliatory action because the defendants possess the documenta-
tion); Carrie Wofford & Lisa Stephanian, Lessons from the First SOX Whistleblower Cases,
COMPLIANCE WK. (Nov. 16, 2004), http://www.wilmerhale.comuploadedFilesIWilmerHale
SharedContent/Files/Editorial/Publication/firstSOX.pdf.
199. See Knutsen, supra note 185, at 253 (explaining that the substantial factor test is
used to determine whether the defendant's negligent conduct was a material element in
bringing about the plaintiffs injury).
200. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text (stating that, under corrective jus-
tice theory, it is appropriate to hold individuals liable for the harm they caused).
201. See supra notes 179-80, 183 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 410 (Utah 1998) (finding
that the plaintiff's actions resulted in the employment decision).
204. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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tion, it is not clear that economic efficiency is increased by using
the substantial factor test.20 5 Rather than creating incentives for
employers to decrease wrongdoing (i.e., stop firing whistleblowers
or discriminating on the basis of protected class), the substantial
factor test incentivizes employers to devote resources toward es-
tablishing justifications for taking action against employees.°
The more evidence the employer can produce that the employee's
job performance or conduct contributed to the adverse action, the
less likely it is that an employee can establish that whistleblow-
207ing was a substantial factor in the adverse action.
D. Contributing Factor Standard
One of the most recently adopted standards in whistleblowing
cases is the contributing factor standard. Used in Missouri, this
standard has the potential to avoid the binary choice problem as-
sociated with the but-for, motivating factor, and substantial fac-
tor standards.2 8 It also has the potential to shift the litigation
away from employee job performance and back to the fundamen-
tal aspects of whistleblower litigation: whether the employee en-
gaged in protected behavior and whether the employer retaliated
against the employee because of that behavior.0 9 The contributing
factor standard does this because there is no materiality thresh-
old on the employer's consideration of the employee's whistleblow-
ing behavior.210 If the employee's whistleblowing behavior con-
tributes to the retaliation to any extent, that is sufficient; thus,
205. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text (outlining the economic theory of
tort law); see also Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., Inc., 968 F.2d 1174, 1180 (11th Cir. 1992)
(discussing how the rule in Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th
Cir. 1988), which requires application of the substantial factor test, creates perverse in-
centives).
206. See Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1178, 1180; Brief of Respondent at 14, BCI Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of L.A. v. EEOC, 450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006) (No. 06-341).
207. See, e.g., Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 969-71 (9th Cir.
2001); Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2001); Miller v.
Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 701, 715-16 (E.D. Wis. 1996).
208. See STEPHEN M. KOHN ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWER LAW: A GUIDE TO LEGAL
PROTECTIONS FOR CORPORATE EMPLOYEES 60, 62 (2004); Amanda Stogsdill, Discrimina-
tion After Daugherty: Are Missouri Courts "Contributing to"or 'Motivated by" the Number
of Cases on the Discrimination Docket?, 73 Mo. L. REV. 651, 651 (2008).
209. See Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of
Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 506-07 (2006).
210. See id. (explaining that the factor influencing an employer's decision does not need
to be necessity or sufficiency or be dispositive in any way).
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the employer cannot easily avoid liability by focusing on the em-
ployee's job performance.
Support for the use of the contributing factor standard is found
in the writings of torts scholars. Professor Leon Green suggested
an approach toward causation in tort claims that focuses on the
question of whether the defendant's conduct contributed "in any
way" to the plaintiffs injury."' If there is such contribution, cau-
sation is established.212 Similarly, Richard Wright also framed the
proper causation inquiry as simply whether the tortious conduct
"contributed to" the injury.13
The upside of no minimum threshold of significance is also the
downside of the contributing factor approach. If 99% of the reason
for firing an employee was due to the employee's poor perfor-
mance and only 1% was due to whistleblowing, then, in theory,
the employer will still be liable because the whistleblowing was a
contributing factor in the decision, and the employee would re-
cover full damages. Thus, while the contributing factor standard
appears more appropriate than the other possible standards, it
has the potential to be seen as unfair from a corrective justice
perspective.
III. A NEW WHISTLEBLOWING CAUSATION STANDARD
What, then, would be the best causation standard in whistle-
blowing cases? Based on the assessment in Part II, a contributing
factor standard appears desirable if the potential for an unjust
result is corrected. To do this, the contributing factor standard
should be adopted along with a variation on comparative fault.
214
The primary problem with lowering the causation standard to
the point where a whistleblowing plaintiff can establish causation
is the potential for overcompensating the plaintiff, as described in
Part II.D. However, by using a variation on comparative fault,
211. Leon Green, Identification of Issues in Negligence Cases, 26 Sw. L.J. 811, 827
(1972).
212. See id. at 814, 827.
213. Wright, supra note 70, at 1744.
214. Martin J. Katz proposed a similar idea in the context of Title VII. See Katz, supra
note 209, at 549-50. There are two primary differences between my proposal and his.
First, he proposes using the motivating factor standard, while I propose the contributing
factor standard. Second, he proposes a fault apportionment system, while I propose a
causal apportionment system.
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the predominant system in place, allocating responsibility when
both the plaintiff and the defendant act negligently to cause the
plaintiffs injury resolves the problem.
The bulk of states allow a plaintiff to recover in tort for injuries
where she and the defendant are both causes of the injury.25 For
example, where the plaintiff and the defendant are driving in an
unreasonably risky manner-such as texting while driving-the
defendant can still be liable for the plaintiffs damages resulting
from the accident. The primary variation among jurisdictions, in
terms of the plaintiffs recovery, is the extent to which the plain-
tiff is at fault in causing the injury.216 Some jurisdictions do not
allow the plaintiff to recover if her fault is equal to or greater
than the defendant's, but do allow recovery otherwise, merely re-
ducing the plaintiffs recovery in proportion to the degree of the
plaintiffs fault.217 Others allow the plaintiff to recover even when
her fault is greater than the defendant's; in these jurisdictions,
the plaintiffs recovery is also reduced in proportion to the extent
of the plaintiffs fault.218 Only a handful of jurisdictions, holdovers
from the older, traditional contributory negligence regime, cate-
gorically refuse to allow a plaintiff to recover when she is also
negligent in causing her injury.219
Comparative fault systems can be viewed as either causation
apportionment or liability apportionment. Emphasizing causa-
tion, the principle is that the plaintiff should not recover for the
portion of the injury that she caused.22 ° Emphasizing fault, the
principle is that the plaintiffs recovery should be reduced by the
percentage to which she is at fault.221
215. See generally Thomas R. Trenkner, Annotation, Modern Development of Compara-
tive Negligence Doctrine Having Applicability to Negligence Actions Generally, 78 A.L.R.
3d 339, 343-47 (1977) (explaining the history of comparative negligence adoption and list-
ing approaches used by the states).
216. Id. at 347 (listing variations).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., Harrison v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 456 A.2d 894, 905 (Md. 1983)
(determining that "whether to abandon the doctrine of contributory negligence in favor of
comparative negligence involves fundamental and basic public policy considerations
properly to be addressed by the legislature" and refusing to judicially abrogate the doc-
trine).
220. See Rizzo & Arnold, supra note 126, at 1406-07 (proposing a causal apportion-
ment framework).
221. See John W. Wade, Comparative Negligence-Its Development in the United States
and Its Present Status in Louisiana, 40 LA. L. REV. 299, 302 (1980).
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The concept of reduction in recovery based on the plaintiffs
less-than-satisfactory behavior appears elsewhere in tort law,
such as with mitigation of damages requirements. Where a plain-
tiff fails to act reasonably to lessen his damages, a plaintiffs re-
covery is reduced by virtue of that failure.22 2 While some courts
consider this causal apportionment (i.e., the plaintiff is the sole
cause of any additional harm that results due to failure to miti-
gate), the Third Restatement of Torts has taken the position that
failure to mitigate should simply be treated as the plaintiffs
fault, and therefore, subject to comparative fault reductions.2 3
As this discussion indicates, there is significant doctrinal sup-
port within tort law for reducing a plaintiffs damages, based on
contribution rather than barring recovery altogether. However,
one cannot simply import comparative fault without adjustments.
Comparative fault is built on a negligence standard; that is, a
plaintiffs recovery is reduced only where the plaintiffs unreason-
ably risky behavior is a cause of his or her own injury.2 4 This
standard must be adapted to account for the baseline employment
at-will rule.
Instead of reducing a plaintiffs recovery where the plaintiff
behaved in an unreasonably risky manner, a comparative reduc-
tion in damages regime in whistleblowing cases would reduce the
plaintiffs recovery by a percentage amount reflecting the extent
to which the plaintiffs unprotected conduct was a cause of the
plaintiffs discharge. This would be a causal apportionment sys-
tem rather than a fault apportionment system.22' The reason for
focusing on causation rather than fault is twofold. First, in an
employment at-will regime, the plaintiff need not be at "fault" in
order to be fired; thus, fault is inapposite in the situation. Second,
the importation of a reduction in damages system is necessary to
resolve a causation proof issue; thus, it is more doctrinally con-
sistent to focus on the causation question rather than determin-
ing damages based on the extent of each party's bad behavior.
222. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 3 cmt. b (Am.
LAW INST. 2000).
223. See id.
224. See id. § 3 cmt. a-b. Of course, the degree to which each party behaved badly may
affect the extent to which a factfinder believes that party caused the adverse action
against the employee; however, moving the focus from extent of bad behavior to extent of
causation will hopefully shift this focus some.
225. Causal apportionment in tort cases has been proposed previously. See Rizzo & Ar-
nold, supra note 126, at 1406 (using economic theory to justify causal apportionment).
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As with comparative fault regimes in negligence, this would be
an affirmative defense, with the employer required to plead and
prove that the employee's behavior contributed to the resulting
damages.
The causation apportionment system should also be a "pure" as
opposed to a "modified" regime. A "pure" comparative fault ap-
proach, which allows the plaintiff to recover even when his fault
is greater than that of the defendant, will better address the cau-
sation issues described above. If a plaintiff is barred from recov-
ery when 51% of the reason for the termination is due to the
plaintiffs own conduct, it will tend toward forcing the problemat-
ic binary choice described above. It will also produce a result that
could be inconsistent with the contributing factor causation
standard for employees. For example, if the whistleblowing con-
tributed to 2% of the employee's termination, the employee would
be able to establish that the whistleblowing fulfilled the causation
standard, but would be unable to receive damages.
In addition, recent empirical research indicates that in modi-
fied comparative fault jurisdictions, where the plaintiff cannot re-
cover if she is more at fault than the defendant, jury nullification
distorts and undercuts the comparative fault regime."' Juries in
modified systems tend to find plaintiffs to be at fault at a rate
that is just below what is required to prevent plaintiffs from be-
ing barred from recovery-leading to overcompensation for such
plaintiffs rather than no compensation . 27 Thus, a pure causal ap-
portionment system would be the better approach.
Another reason for the adoption of a contributing factor stand-
ard coupled with a causal apportionment system in whistleblow-
ing cases is the public importance of promoting whistleblowing.
The majority of negligence claims do not involve conduct that
harmed a large segment of the population; they are cases involv-
ing individuals who harmed other individuals. The public inter-
ests at stake are promoting an efficient level of safety (pursuant
to law and economics theories) and ensuring that those who cause
226. Eli K. Best & John J. Donohue III, Jury Nullification in Modified Comparative
Negligence Regimes, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 945, 946 (2012) (finding that juries in modified
comparative negligence jurisdictions are substantially less likely to find a plaintiff more
than 50% negligent).
227. Id. at 975, 977.
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harm to others compensate those who are harmed (pursuant to
corrective justice theories).
These same interests are at stake in whistleblowing claims, but
the scale of potential harm is significantly greater in whistleblow-
ing cases. While negligence claims typically involve harm to an
individual, whistleblowing claims involve harm to others beyond
the individual. The core concept of the whistleblower is that a
company is violating the law. The corporate violation puts the
public in harm's way-whether it be financial in nature, such as
whistleblowing under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,228 or physical, such
as with whistleblowing under the Energy Reorganization Act.
29
The difference between the interests at stake in whistleblowing
litigation is highlighted by the Edward Snowden situation. Snow-
den, who disclosed data-gathering by the NSA, revealed infor-
mation about potential unlawful governmental conduct. If his
revelations are correct, millions of Americans had their rights vio-
lated by the federal government.2 3 1 This is a far cry from the in-
terests at stake when a negligent driver hits another motorist. If
a comparative fault regime is necessary to protect the interests of
less-than-perfect plaintiffs in car accidents, causal apportionment
is surely appropriate to protect the public interest at stake in
whistleblowing cases.
Furthermore, using causal apportionment will increase the
likelihood that a case will reach the jury. In the current system, it
appears that courts sometimes find causation in favor of the em-
ployer even in cases where there is arguably a factual issue for
the jury.232 A causal apportionment system, however, decreases
the likelihood that a case can be decided on a motion for summary
judgment by making it far more difficult for a judge to determine
that there is no factual issue for a jury to decide as to causation.
Potential arguments against importing comparative fault to
this system include: (1) it is inappropriate to apply a negligence-
228. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, & 29 U.S.C.).
229. See 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (2012).
230. Barton Gellman, Edward Snowden, After Months of NSA Revelations, Says His




232. Modesitt, supra note 2, at 185.
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based concept in what is akin to an intentional tort case33 and (2)
causal apportionment is merely an additional limitation on the
ability of whistleblowers to recover.234
As to the first argument, common law claims for whistleblow-
ing are intentional tort claims. Thus, there is a legitimate argu-
ment to be made that whistleblowing claims should be informed
by tort doctrine. In addition, using consistent doctrine in both
common law and statutory cases would be helpful to practition-
ers, who currently face a bewildering array of statutory and
common law standards. Furthermore, there are a number of situ-
ations in which different types of conduct are subject to compara-
tive analysis in torts.35 It is an accepted practice in some states
with strict liability claims. In those cases, a company's sale of a
defective product is compared with an injured plaintiff's negli-
gence in the use of that product. '36 Furthermore, these compari-
sons have been justified by tort theorists on a number of
grounds.237
While the second argument appears to have some merit in the
abstract, it ignores the reality in whistleblowing cases (as well as
employment discrimination). Plaintiffs are losing.3 ' Plaintiffs are
losing in large part because of difficulties in proving that it was
an improper motive rather than a legitimate reason for their ter-
mination. '39 So long as employment remains at-will and employ-
ers can point to any basis for the firing that is not legally barred,
employees will struggle to disprove employer-provided reasons for
their termination. And so long as it is an all-or-nothing game in
which employers have documentation supporting their reason
233. See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L.
REV. 1431, 1457-58 (2012) (arguing that the importation of what is essentially a proxi-
mate cause standard into employment discrimination law is inappropriate because dis-
crimination is intentional in nature).
234. See, e.g., Field v. Boyer Co., L.C., 952 P.2d 1078, 1088 (Utah 1998) (Stewart, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that, in the context of applying compar-
ative fault to intentional torts between two defendants, a comparison can distort the pro-
tections meant to protect the plaintiff).
235. See Dan B. Dobbs, Accountability and Comparative Fault, 47 LA. L. REV. 939,
944-47 (1987).
236. See, e.g., Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Cal. 1978) (applying
comparative fault principles to reduce the plaintiffs recovery in a products liability ac-
tion).
237. See, e.g., Rizzo & Arnold, supra note 126, at 1406-07 (justifying causal apportion-
ment among tortfeasors within and beyond negligence claims based on economic theory).
238. See Modesitt, supra note 2, at 181-82.
239. See id.
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while employees do not, judges will continue to choose the em-
ployer's reason over the employee's. But if the reasons can coex-
ist, employees will be able to at least recover partial damages,
which is significantly better than the current situation. It is not,
perhaps, ideal, and it may devalue the societal interests in pro-
moting whistleblowing. But some recovery is better than no re-
covery.
CONCLUSION
The current state of whistleblowing law has produced a system
of protection in name only for whistleblowers. In order to correct
this, changes must be made to whistleblowing doctrine. Because
causation is an aspect of the claim that has made it difficult for
plaintiffs to prevail, it is a logical starting point in this process.
Using a lower causation standard-the contributing factor stand-
ard-will ensure that where whistleblowing is a component in the
decision to fire an employee, that employee can establish a claim.
Adding in causal apportionment will allow recovery without pro-
ducing windfall damages for plaintiffs. Thus, it should be adopted
by statute and/or judicial decision to apply in whistleblowing cas-
es.
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